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COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE WTO SYSTEM
Mitsuo Matsushita
I. THE WTO SYSTEM - A NEW MULTILATERAL TRADE ORDER
A. The Uruguay Round Trade Negotiation and the
Establishment of the WTO
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the product of the
Uruguay Round Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the UR) which is
the 8th Round under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).' Beginnning in 1986 and ending in 1993,2 the WTO was
the longest and perhaps the most difficult trade negotiation in the
history of the GATT.$ Negotiations were by no means smooth. In
fact, the entire process almost collapsed due to the parties failure to
agree on such items as agriculture and antidumping matters.' For
example, the United States and the European Communities differed
on issues relating to agricultural subsidies and the United States
and Japan diverged on matters relating to antidumping.5 Eventu-
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
55 U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT], reprinted in GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS I (4th Supp. 1969). For major works on the GATT, see generally KENNETH W. DAM,
THE GATT-LAw AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970); ROBERT E. HUDEC,
THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1975); JOHN H. JACKSON, RE-
STRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT (1969) [hereinafter JACKSON, LAW OF GATT]; JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989); EDMOND McGov-
ERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION (2d ed. 1986).
2. David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disci-
plines, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 817, 819 (1994). For additional commentary on the concept of the
World Trade Organization, see JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990).
3. Robert R. Wilson, Proposed ITO Charter, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 879, 879-85 (1947); see also
Clair Wilcox, Basic Principles in Establishment of International Trade Organization, 15 DEP'T
ST. BULL. No. 382, Oct. 27, 1946 (noting the historical developments and fundamental principles
which fueled the genesis of the ITO).
4. Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 459, 462 (1994).
5. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
[hereinafter Uruguay Round], GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994), re-
printed in Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uru-
guay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Version of 15 December 1993) (1993).
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ally, the negotiating parties compromised and on December 15,
1993, the "Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations" was adopted.6 On April 15,
1994, the contracting parties signed the Final Act and the WTO
was officially born on January 1, 1995."
Although a detailed discussion of the WTO is beyond the scope of
this Article, a brief overview of the WTO system is useful. The
WTO Agreement (formally entitled "Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization") includes Annex 1A through 1C, An-
nex 2, Annex 3 and Annex 4.8
Annex 1A through 1C contain the major agreements on subject
matters of international trade. Annex 1A, entitled "Multilateral
Agreements on Trade in Goods," deals with the liberalization of
trade in goods.9 This is accompanied by 13 agreements such as
"Agreement on Agriculture," "Agreement on implementation of
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade" (An-
tidumping Agreement) and "Agreement on Safeguards (Safeguard
Agreement)."' 10 Annex 1B is entitled "General Agreement on Trade
in Services and Annexes" (The GATS)," and Annex IC is entitled
"Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights" (The
TRIPs).12
Annex 2, entitled "Understanding on Rules and Procedures Gov-
erning the Settlement of Disputes," sets out rules on the procedures
for settling disputes among member states."' Annex 3, entitled
6. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Practices, Restrictive Business
Practices, U.N. Economic and Social Council, 13th Sess., 546th Meeting, U.N. Doc. 5/SR 546
(1951); U.N. Doc. E/2380, (1953); Wirth, supra note 2, at 819-20.
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Restrictive Business Practices (1995).
8. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-A (Dec.
15, 1993) [hereinafter WTO Agreement], in Uruguay Round, supra note 5; see also Mitsuo Mat-
sushita, The Structural Impediments Initiative: An Example of Bilateral Trade Negotiation, 12
MICH. J. INT'L L. 436, 436-39 (1991) (discussing the Structural Impediments Initiative and the
trade policies and negotiations between the United States and Japan).
9. Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-AlA (Dec. 15,
1993), in Uruguay Round, supra note 5.
10. Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-AIA (Dec. 15,
1993), in Uruguay Round, supra note 5.
11. General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-AIB
(Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter GATS], in Uruguay Round, supra note 5.
12. Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-AIC
(Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter TRIPs], in Uruguay Round, supra note 5.
13. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, GATT Doc.
MTN/FA II-A2 (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Dispute Rules], in Uruguay Round, supra note 5.
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"Trade Policy Review Mechanism" (The TRPM),' 4 establishes the
TPRM as the body which reviews trade practices of member states
and points out issues which are problematical in light of the agree-
ments.15 Annex 4, entitled "Plurilateral Trade Agreement," con-
tains four agreements such as Agreement on Government Procure-
ment.16 A member state must adopt all of the above agreements
except for Annex 4 when it joins the WTO agreement. 17 This ap-
proach is called a single undertaking."8
B. Salient Features of the WTO System as Compared with the
GATT
1. Extensive Coverage of Areas
There are several important features of the WTO which distin-
guish it from the GATT. First, the coverage of the WTO is far
wider than that of the GATT. For example, for the first time in the
history of GATT, there is an agreement on agriculture which pro-
hibits import restrictions' and reduces agricultural subsidies.2  In
addition to agreements on agriculture, the textile agreement eventu-
ally incorporates textile trade into the WTO's reqular Safeguard
Agreement, which prohibits member states from engaging in "vol-
untary export restraint" agreement,2' and abolishes the "Multilat-
eral Fibre Agreement" (the MFA). 2
Not only are there agreements on trade in goods, such as agre-
14. Trade Policy Review Mechanisms, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-A3 (Dec. 15, 1993) [her-
inafetr TPRM], in Uruguay Round, supra note 5.
15. TPRM, supra note 14.
16. Plurilateral Trade Agreement, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-A4 (Dec. 15, 1993), in Uruguay
Round, supra note 7; see also International Antitrust Code Will Be Studied by GATT Members,
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 1628, (Spec. Supp. Aug. 19, 1993) (discussing the
attempts by the International Antitrust Codeworking Group to bring international antitrust law
into conformity with modern international business practices).
17. Report of Special Committee on International Antitrust, A.B.A. SEc. ANTITRUST L.
(1991).
18. Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Trade & the 21st Century-Rounding the Circle, 48 RECORD OF
THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 535, 535-88 (1993).
19. Agreement on Agriculture, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-AlA, Part III, Art. IV, note 1 [here-
inafter Agriculture Agreement] ("These measures include qualitative import restrictions"), in
Uruguay Round, supra note 5; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Proposals for Negotiating International
Competition Rules in the GATT-WTO World Trade and Legal System, Aussnwirtschaft, 49,
Jahrgang (1994), Heft II/III: Ruegger S. 231-277 [hereinafter Petersmann, Proposals for
Negotiating].
20. Agriculture Agreement, supra note 19, at Part III, Art. IV.
21. Id. ("Members shall not maintain, resort, or revert to ... voluntary export restraints.").
22. Id. art. I.
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ments on antidumping, 3  countervailing duty,2 4 and safeguard, 5
there are also agreements in "new areas" such as trade in services
and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights." In the
area of trade in services, the GATT establishes principles of most
favored nation 27  and transparency.2 8 Although liberalization in
trade in services is in the embroynic stage, it is significant that the
WTO has established a framework for its development. In the area
of intellectual property rights, the TRIPs2 9 provides for minimum
standards for the protection of intellectual property rights and for a
fair and equitable enforcement process.3 0
2. Improved Dispute Settlement Process
Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement provides for an improved dis-
pute settlement procedure among the member states.3 ' Under this
system, when a dispute arises with regard to the interpretation or
operation of a WTO agreement, the plaintiff state petitions to the
Dispute Settlement Body (the DSB). 2 The DSB then turns the
complaint over to a dispute settlement panel which is composed of 3
or 5 experts selected by the DSB.31 The panel reports to the DSB on
the compatibility of the practice complained of with the rules of the
WTO Agreements. 34 If the panel reports that the practice is incom-
patible, the DSB decides the case in favor of the plaintiff state by a
negative consensus.33 The defendant state can then appeal to the
Appellate Review Body ("ARB")3 As its name indicates, the ARB
23. See Charnovitz, supra note 4, at 462.
24. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-A1A-13,
in Uruguay Round, supra note 5.
25. See supra note 10.
26. See TRIPs, supra note 12.
27. GATS, supra note 11, art. II.
28. Id.
29. TRIPs, supra note 12.
30. Id.
31. Dispute Rules, supra note 13, at Art. I. Under the WTO system, the dispute settlement
process is characterized as a "judicial process" as opposed to a "political process" as characterized
under the GATT system where negotiations and compromises are the key factor for determina-
tion. Put in strong terms, the WTO establishes something like an "international trade tribunal" in
which a dispute between member states is adjudicated.
32. Dispute Rules, supra note 13, art. 1, 1 1.
33. Id. art. 6-8.
34. Id.
35. Id. Negative consensus means that decision will be carried when the panel proposal is not
denied by a unanimity of DSB members.
36. Dispute Rules, supra note 13, art. 1, 1 1.
1100 [Vol. 44:1097
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acts as an appellate court and either affirms or overturns the DSB's
judgement. 7 If the ARB decision is in favor of the plaintiff state,
the DSB again decides the case by a negative consensus.
In the above described dispute settlement process, a dispute set-
tlement panel and the ARB analyze the legality of the practice in
question and reach a conclusion as to its validity. However, if the
panel or the ARB report that the practice complained of is contrary
to rules of the WTO Agreements, the decision is almost automati-
cally adopted in light of the fact that the DSB's decision is by nega-
tive consensus and the plaintiff state will most likely vote in favor.
This means that the DSB's resolution serves as little more than a
ceremonial approval of the panel and the ARB's decision.
There may be concern that the international community is not
ready for this advanced dispute settlement process and thus, this
new process will not work effectively. It is possible that a powerful
state may not observe the decision of the DSB when a vital national
interest is at stake. However, in the globalized economy of today, it
is necessary to maintain a stable legal order in the world trade. Ac-
cordingly, a rule oriented mechanism for settling trade disputes is
essential both in the domestic economy and at the international
level. Therefore, it is worthwhile to give the new dispute settlement
process a try. In the above scheme, the markets of the member
states will be more and more integrated and economies will tend to
be globalized. This trend is nothing but a continuation from the old
GATT regime. However, the pace of globalization will be
accelerated.
C. The Role of Competition Policy in the WTO
1. A Historical Background
Shortly after the Second World War, the Bretton-Woods System
was established, with the International Monetary Fund (the IMF)
and the Bank of Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank)
at the center.3 8 With regard to trade, a comprehensive charter
called "the ITO Charter," also known as the "the Havana Char-
37. Id.
38. See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 100 (1991). See generally
Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a People-Centered
Transnational Legal Order?. 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 3 (1993) (discussing various topics
regarding the IMF and the World Bank).
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ter, '"" was proposed.4 Although the ITO Charter was never ratified
in the major states,' some portions were adopted in the GATT and
served as "provisional" trade rules until they were just recently su-
perseded by the WTO. 2
For example, Chapter V of the ITO Charter, proposed compre-
hensive provisions dealing with restrictive business practices."3 These
provisions provided for a comprehensive control over price-fixing
and other forms of anti-competition law." The framers of the Char-
ter thought that without provisions which would control anti-com-
petitive practices engaged in by private enterprises, the effect of
trade liberalization to be achieved through the reduction of tariff
and removal of import restrictions would be offset by the restrictive
effects of anti-competitive practices of private enterprises.4 5 Clearly,
competition policy and law were integral part of the ITO Charter.
Unfortunately, however, because the comprehensive restrictive pro-
visions for the anti-competitive practices of private enterprises were
not incorporated in the GATT,46 interest in developing an interna-
tional antitrust code quickly died with its non-ratification of the
ITO Charter. 7 Furthermore, although the U.N. Economic and So-
cial Council also considered the creation of an international code, 48
there was no concrete result. 9 International competition law and
policy was taken up by the GATT in late 1950's,50 again without a
concrete proposal.' International competition law and policy has
also been promoted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
39. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Mar. 24, 1984, U.N. Doc. E/
Conf.2/78 [hereinafter Havana Charter], reprinted in U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4 (1948), and in U.S.
Dep't of State Pub. No. 3206, Commercial Policy Series No. 113 (1948).
40. P.M. McRae & J.C. Thomas, The GATT and Multilateral Treaty Making: The Tokyo
Round, 77 AMER. J. INT'L L. 51, 52 (1983).
41. Theresa A. Amato, Loan Rights Conditionality: United States Trade Legislation and the
International Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 79, 87 (1990).
42. Id. at 87-88.
43. Id. at 86.
44. Id.
45. See generally CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 3-53 (1949) (providing a
historical treatment of the activities leading up to the Havana Conference).
46. GATT, supra note 1.
47. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Address: The International Dimension of Competition Policy, 17
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 833, 839 (1994) (emphasizing that GATT failed to address private restric-
tive practices).
48. SIDNEY DELL, THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 15-19 (1990).
49. Id.
50. JACKSON, LAW OF GATT, supra note 1, at 51-53.
51. Id.
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and Development (OECD).5 2 The OECD engaged in an exchange of
information and a coordination of competition policies among the
enforcement authorities of member states, which resulted in the
publication of several reports on competition policy subjects.53
Although defunct, the ITO Charter shared the common purpose
of liberalizing trade through the creation of a uniform competition
law. Thus, as it was true with the ITO, competition law and policy
is a necessary part of the WTO.
2. An Increasing Role of Competition Policy in the WTO
Although the WTO system is not without defects, free trade will
be more effectively promoted than under the GATT system because
of the WTO's further reduction of tariffs. 4 The WTO agreements
also include an increase in the coverage of liberalization measures,
such as trade in services and trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights, the abolition of voluntary export restraint and a
more effective dispute settlement process.55 As mentioned earlier,
because anti-competitive practices of private enterprises offset the
liberalization of trade in goods and services, it is necessary to con-
struct some principles and mechanisms to promote competition pol-
icy at the international level in order to maintain the effectiveness of
the WTO's liberalization of trade in goods and services.
3. Need for Ensuring a Fair Opportunity to Market Access
The primary purpose of the WTO system is to maintain free
trade among member states. 6 As such, this system should guaran-
tee a fair and equitable opportunity for market access by enterprises
of member states into the national markets of other member states.
52. See ROGER BLANPAIN, THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: EXPE-
RIENCE AND MID-TERM REPORT 1979-1982 (1983); ROGER BLANPAIN, THE OECD GUIDELINES
FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND LABOR RELATIONS, 1976-1979; ExPERIENCE AND RE-
VIEW (1979).
53. OECD: Guidelines for Multinational Enterprise, June 21, 1976, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 969
(1976); see also Barry E. Hawk, The OECD Guidelines for the Multinational Enterprises: Com-
petition, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 241, 244 (1977) (discussing OECD competition guidelines in light
of antitrust laws).
54. WTO Agreement, supra note 8, at 1-14.
55. For a general discussion of the need for antitrust convergence, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Remedies Along With Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT, 88 AMER. J. INT'L L. 477
(1994); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New Protectionism: The
Need for a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT'L LAW & COM. REG. 394 (1994).
56. WTO Agreement, supra note 8, at 1-14.
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If impediments to market access, whether governmental or private,
are not properly addressed, claims of "unfair trade" among the gov-
ernments and industries will eventually lead to protectionism. For
example, abuses of antidumping legislation or other forms of trade
restriction are likely protectionist responses. Therefore, the key con-
cept is "market access." In terms of the WTO system, market ac-
cess should be regarded as an "equal opportunity" to compete on
the merits. Market access in this sense is not necessarily synony-
mous with an increase of import, investment or other activities in
the market of a member state. Rather, import, investment and other
business activities are decided by conditions of the market in ques-
tion and competition laws only guarantee that there will be "oppor-
tunities" to compete - not necessarily larger market shares in any
given market.
The WTO Agreements attempt to guarantee such market access
through the removal or reduction of governmental barriers and the
convergence of national institutions such as the intellectual property
rights vis & vis the TRIPs Agreements. 7 In addition to these agree-
ments, other measures to ensure market access vis 6 vis private bar-
riers will become increasingly important.
D. Globalized Economy and Incompatibility of Different
Regulatory/Business Systems
Assuming the WTO system is effective, the national economies
will move toward a "globalized economy." 58 However, when govern-
mental barriers to trade, such as tariffs and import restrictions, are
removed or reduced, different kinds of trade issues will emerge. For
example, as transnational business activities increase, differences in
domestic regulatory systems of the trading states and differences in
business customs and behaviors become impediments. 9
Similarly, differences in governmental regulation of business ac-
57. Michael 1. Doane, TRIPS and International Intellectual Property Protection in an Age of
Advancing Technology. 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 465, 469 (analyzing the development of the
TRIPS, the TRIPS agreement, and the future of intellectual property protection).
58. See Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, "To Dream the Impossible Dream": Globalization and
Harmonization of Environmental Laws, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 205, 207-08 (1995)
(noting that the various trade agreements such as GATT, EU, LFTA, and NAFTA, are attempts
at a global free trade movement).
59. Kojo Yelpaala, Strategy and Planning in Global Product Distribution - Beyond the Dis-
tribution Contract, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 839, 849-66 (1994) (discussing the effect of
globalization on business practices).
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tivities such as technical standards, taxation, competition rules, en-
vironmental protection measure, and labor standards create barriers
to enterprises.6 0 Such differences create disparity among states in
the conditions in which enterprises engage in business activities and
cause differences in competition policy. One such disparity arises
with regard to exempted cartels. Such differences adversely affect
the "level playing field" and engender claims of "unfairness" in in-
ternational trade. Consequently, the harmonization of different reg-
ulatory systems among the trading states becomes a primary focus.
This is true not only in government regulation of business activi-
ties, but also in business customs and corporate behavior. For exam-
ple, in the context of United States/European Union trade with Ja-
pan, "keiretsu" systems (long-term closely interconnected
relationships among Japanese enterprises through formal and/or in-
formal relations)61 and mutual stock-holdings among corporations
have been claimed as trade barriers. In the era of globalized econ-
omy in which governmental barriers are much less important, such
differences in business customs and corporate behaviors acquire an
increasing importance as impediments to trade. 2
For example, in the European Union (EU), which removed gov-
ernmental barriers such as tariffs and import restrictions,63 competi-
tion policy measures played a vital role in ensuring that the common
market operates without hindrances by private restrictive business
practices. Articles 85 and 86 together with the Merger Regulation
Rule have been applied to ensure that the common market operate
effectively. 4 Special competition rules in the EU, such as vertical
territorial allocations imposed by manufacturers on their distribu-
tors according to national boundaries of member states, have been
strictly applied. 5 A per se illegality approach to such a vertical ter-
60., Bernabe-Riefkohl, supra note 58, at 211-27 (discussing the difficulties in assimilating Free-
Trade and Environmental policies, and the conflicts that can arise).
61. Angelina Helou, The Nature and Competetiveness of Japan's Keiretsu, 25 J. WORLD
TRADE LAW 99 (1991).
62. There is a conflict or incompatibility of systems whether it is a system of governmental
regulation or that of private customs. These incompatibility issues are found in many different
kinds of governmental regulations and private customs and practices. However, our focus here is
on issues related to competition policy.
63. Political Changes in East Europe to Speed Economic Plans, Experts Say, Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 50, at 1669 (Dec. 20, 1989).
64. See supra note 7.
65. Frederic Yves Jenny, Competition and State Aid Policy in the European Community, 18
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 525, 535-36 (1994).
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ritorial restriction under Article 85 is a unique feature of the EU
competition law.66 The per se approach symbolizes that the removal
of private restrictions on exports and imports is essential to the
wholesomeness of the common market system.
Similarly, in the Structural Impediment Initiative (the SII), nego-
tiated between the United States and Japan between 1980 and
1990, restrictive business customs and corporate behaviors were the
major impediments to effective market .access by foreign enterprises
to the Japanese market.67 Accordingly, both governments agreed to
reforms. For example, reforms to Japanese antimonopoly law in-
cluded an increase of administrative surcharges and criminal fines to
be imposed on enterprises when they engage in cartels.68
Differences in business customs and behaviors are rooted deeply
in the history of the state and generally are far more wide-ranging
and complex than an application of competition rules can possible
tackle. In this sense, a strengthened application of competition rules
provides only a partial and insufficient solution. However, competi-
tion rules can play a useful role in promoting an open market in
which foreign enterprises can find the way to the domestic market of
a state through superior efficiency and diligence. Issues described
above with regard to the EU common market and the SII are also
issues that the WTO must deal with either today or in the future.
Although the liberalization of trade in the multilateral trading sys-
tem under the WTO is not as complete as the common market in
the EU, it is a system of trading states in which the principle is free
access to each other's market. Although there are more exceptions
to the principle of free trade under the WTO than there are in the
EU, such exceptions will be reduced in due course.69 There will be a
greater need to increase the application of competition rules in the
framework of the WTO in order to maintain market access among
member states.
66. Thomas C. Meyers, Field-of-Use Restrictions as Procompetetive Elements in Patent and
Know-How Licensing Agreements in the United States and the European Communities, 12 J.
INT'L L. Bus. 364, 384 (1991).
67. Anti-Monopoly Law Needs to be Revised Soon, Japanese Fair Trade Commission Panel
Says, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 230 (Feb. 14, 1990).
68. See Charnovitz, supra note 4, at 464.
69. Joseph P. Griffin, EC and US Extraterritoriality: Activism and Cooperation, 17 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 353, 356 (1994).
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E. Extraterritoriality
In some states competition rules are applied to the conduct of for-
eign enterprises occurring in a foreign state but affecting the domes-
tic market of the applying state."' This is true with competition
rules in the United States, the EU and Germany. 1
Under United States v. Aluminum Company of America,72 the
United States courts are authorized to apply United States antitrust
laws to conduct that occurs in a foreign state but is intended to
affect the United States and does in fact bring about such an ef-
fect.73 Recently, the United States Justice Department announced a
draft of guidelines on international operations. 74 The guidelines ex-
press the United States enforcement policy with regard to restrictive
practices engaged in by foreign enterprises in foreign countries
which affect U.S. markets and U.S. business activities abroad.75
One of the striking features of the guidelines is the wide-range of
subject matter jurisdiction that the Justice Department will assert
with regard to the conduct of foreign enterprises in a foreign coun-
try.76 Another striking feature is its emphasis on "market access" in
a foreign market." A number of hypothetical examples are offered
where the conduct of foreign enterprises in foreign countries pro-
duces restrictive effects on United States enterprises which intend to
export or invest in a foreign country.78
Similarly, the European Court of Justice in A. Ahistrom Osakey-
tio v. Commission ("The Woodpulp case") 79 approved an extrater-
ritorial application of the EU competition rules to conduct by for-
eign enterprises which occurred in foreign countries but affected the
commerce among member states.80 It is not clear whether the scope
70. Id.
71. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
72. Id.
73. Senior Justice Official Outlines Aim of International Antitrust Guidelines, Int'l Trade




77. See generally Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, United
States Department of Justice Guidelines 22-27 (Nov. 10, 1988).
78. A. Ahlstrom Osakeytio v. Commission, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,491 (Sept. 27,
1988).
79. Id.
80. See James T. Halverson, Antitrust in a Global Environment: Conflicts and Resolutions,
Harmonization and Coordination of International Merger Procedures, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 531,
534 (1991) (discussing the Woodpulp case).
19951 1107
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
of jurisdiction established by the Woodpulp case covers conducts of
foreign enterprises in foreign countries which adversely affect export
or investing opportunities of EU enterprises in the market of such
foreign countries.81 It seems that, at least in theory, the scope of
application can be stretched to that extent.8 2
In an era in which national boundaries in economy are fast disap-
pearing, extraterritorial application of competition rules is to a de-
gree inevitable." Without such application, transnational business
entities could engage in restrictive business practices in a "twilight
zone" where no state could fully exercise jurisdiction and yet the
harmful effects of such restrictive business practices would be felt in
one or more states.8 ' As such, a state may have no choice but to
apply its competition rules to the conduct of foreign enterprises
abroad when such conduct hurts its economy and when the foreign
state has no competition rules or is not willing to apply its own com-
petition rules. In addition, an extraterritorial application of competi-
tion rules by one state can arguably increase the economic welfare
of one or more states and thereby liberate trade and investment
internationally.
In spite of the above, an extraterritorial application of competi-
tion rules is a second-best solution. Although an extraterritorial ap-
plication of competition rules is legally possible in some jurisdictions
(notably the United States), such an application is often not as ef-
fective as it would be if applied domestically. For instance, there
may be difficulty in obtaining personal and enforcement jurisdiction
over the defendant enterprise, i.e.; there may be a blocking statute
in a foreign state (such as the United Kingdom)8 5 in which the for-
eign defendant prohibits extraterritorial enforcement. Additionally,
the national may prevent the state's enforcement mechanism from
81. Id. at 534.
82. See Increased Use of Extraterritoriality Could Threaten International Business, [July-
Dec] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.-REP. (BNA) No. 1334, at 532 (Oct. 1, 1987). (discussing the
"growing incidence of countries trying to apply their national laws outside their borders").
83. See id. (stating that the harmful effects felt by states include "discouraging productive
economic activity, including international investment, and ultimately to reduce employment and
economic growth").
84. District Court's Decision and Order in In Re Insurance Antitrust Litigation, Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1434, at 432, 444 (stating that "a number of barriers stand in the
way of enforcement of any judgment against these defendants by English courts").
85. United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Ctr., Inc., 134 F. Supp. 710, 711-12
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (holding that the district court in New York had jurisdiction over a Swiss Cor-
poration which allegedly committed violations of anti-trust and tariff laws in the Souther District
of New York).
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producing necessary pieces of evidence to a court of a state attempt-
ing to apply its competition law.
Also, jurisdictional conflicts often arise from extraterritorial ap-
plication. The United States antitrust case law is replete with exam-
ples in which an attempt on the part of the enforcement authority in
the United States resulted in conflicts with other states. The Swiss
Watch Case,86 the Laker Case,87 and the Uranium Case,88 are but a
few of many such examples. Such conflicts may bring about tensions
and ill-feeling between the state applying its competition law and
the state to which such an application is made.
If we look at the situation as a whole it seems that an extraterri-
torial application of competition rules may be a costly attempt to
rectify violations and the result may not be as great as one may
hope. At this time, it is only the United States which expresses an
intention to apply United States antitrust laws extraterritorially. If,
however, more states (such as EU, Germany, and Japan) launch a
massive attempt to use their competition rules in a similar way,
there may be too many tensions and conflicts among trading states.
In light of the above, it is useful to think about a better alternative
to a unilateral application of competition rules of a state.
This calls for a comprehensive study of the subject and this paper
is not intended to discuss the details of extraterritoriality. We only
note that considerations of some alternative approaches to extrater-
ritoriality are necessary. They may include a variety of matters such
as a scheme of "positive comity," an exchange of informations
among the enforcement agencies of the member states and a greater
utilization of the dispute settlement process of the WTO Agreement
with regard to the jurisdictional disputes.
II. CONVERGENCE OF COMPETITIVE LAW AND POLICY
A. A Need for Convergence
The situations described above underscore the need for the con-
86. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(affirming a preliminary injunction prohibiting foreign interference which would "rob the court of
its jurisdiction").
87. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 473 F. Supp. 393, 400-06 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (holding that
competitors had standing under antitrust laws to challenge a corporation's use of uranium).
88. International Antitrust Code Will Be Studied By GAH Members, Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at 259 (For the full DIAC text see International Antitrust Code Working
Group, Antitrust Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at S-9-22 (Spec. Supp. Aug. 19, 1991).
1995] 1109
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
vergence of competition rules within the framework of the WTO. If
convergence of competition rules can effectively be achieved, the
problems presented above may be resolved and, if not resolved,
greatly mitigated.
As stated before, claims for "unfairness" in trade arise out of dis-
parity in the competitive conditions among the WTO member states
resulting from differences in the strength of enforcement of competi-
tion rules among them. For example, a weak enforcement of compe-
tition rules in a member state leads to a claim by another member
state that its industries are disadvantaged due to the foreclosure of
the domestic market through restrictive business practices of enter-
prises in the former state which are allowed to take place by the
lack of enforcement. Retaliatory measures by way of import restric-
tions or other trade restrictions imposed on products exported may
be the natural reaction. For example, when products are exported at
low prices from the former state to the latter state, there will be a
claim that exporters engage in "dumping" of the products. This will
lead to proliferation of antidumping actions.
If principles and enforcement of competition rules in member
states in the WTO can be effectively converged, claims for unfair-
ness in international trade will be greatly reduced. Enterprises in
member states will compete under similar conditions as far as com-
petition law is concerned and the "level playing field" requirement
will thereby be satisfied. Such a convergence will also lessen the
need for extraterritorial application of competition rules of one
member state vis-hi-vis activities which occur in other member states
since competition laws of the locality in which such activities take
place can take care of them more effectively.
III. SCHEMES FOR CONVERGENCE
A. Proposals Already Made
There are several proposals for convergence of competition rules
within the framework of the WTO. A brief review of such proposals
follows.
A most comprehensive proposal is the Draft International Anti-
trust Code ("DIAC") proposed by a group of competition law schol-
ars ("The Munich Group"). 9 The DIAC advocates the establish-
89. Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) S-20, at 1628 (Spec. Supp. Aug. 19, 1993) (stating
that the International Antitrust Authority, a new GATT agency, would have the power to ask
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ment of an international antitrust agency which shares the
responsibility of enforcement of international antitrust code with the
national governments.9" The comprehensive antitrust code would
cover the major areas of competition law including horizontal agree-
ment, mergers and acquisitions, and the relationship between com-
petition law and industrial policies and customs.9
Ideas expressed in the DIAC are similar to Chapter V of the ITO
Charter and the DIAC was probably drafted with such intention.
The DIAC is the most ambitious of the proposals made in recent
years.
A more modest proposal is that a task force established by the
American Bar Association which advocates an agreement among
states with regard to some basic principles such as unlawfulness of
cartels and unification of filing requirements under the merger laws
of various states.92 The ABA proposal advocates partial harmoniza-
tion through an agreement among states regarding some basic prin-
ciples without establishing a comprehensive international authority
to enforce international rules.93
Professor Eleanor Fox of New York University Law School has
further developed this idea and has proposed a scheme in which
states agree on "a few fundamental world-linking principles" of
competition policy such as, among other things, prohibition of car-
tels and positive comity. 9 In this scheme, each state basically en-
forces its own competition rules while adopting fundamental princi-
ples established in an international agreement.9 5
B. A Proposal for a "Modest" International Competition Code
Although a good model for the future, the DIAC proposal is
probably premature given the nation state system of today where
each state jealously guards its sovereignty. It should be reserved for
national antitrust authorities to initiate enforcement).
90. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws & The New Protectionism: The
Need for a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 393, 420-21 (1994).
91. Report of Special Committee on International Antitrust, A.B.A. SEc. ANTITRUST L.
(1991); Halverson, supra note 81, at 534.
92. Barry E. Hawk, Antitrust in a Global Environment: Conflicts and Resolutions, Introduc-
tory Remarks, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 525, 526 (1991) (discussing the Report of the Special Commit-
tee on International Antitrust which addresses "deterring cartel behavior" and "harmonization of
substantive nerger rules").
93. Fox, supra note 18, at 570.




the future when globalization of economies will have advanced to a
degree where competition law will need a supra-national enforce-
ment process such as in the EU. For today, we should start modestly
with a step-by-step approach.
It is useful to formulate a set of principles for competition policy
into a code which establishes the minimum standards of competition
law to be observed by the member states. We should carefully select
the areas of competition policy in which there is a greater need for
convergence and a general agreement or consensus with regard to
the principles to be applied. An illustrative list of such proposals
includes the following:
1. Horizontal Agreement
Certain types of horizontal agreements should be held as unlawful
in principle. These include agreements among competitors which fix
prices, divide markets or otherwise suppress competition, lessen effi-
ciency and have no redeeming virtues.
There are some horizontal agreements which may affect competi-
tion but may generate efficiency or may serve other useful purposes.
For example, an agreement in which enterprises engage in a joint
research and development, a joint production of small enterprises or
a joint operation for the disposal of industrial wastes all may en-
hance useful economic and social purposes. They should be dealt
with under "the rule of reason." 6
2. Exemption of Cartels
In varying degrees, exempted cartels such as export cartels, crisis
cartels, small business cartels and others are allowed in member
states.9" There should be a thorough review of such exemptions with
regard to the need for them. Member states should agree that they
will abolish exempted cartels generally except for exceptional situa-
tions such as some types of crisis cartels.
96. JFTC Expects to Propose Elimination of Cartels Now Exempt From Antitrust Attack,
[July-Dec] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1334, at 604 (Nov. 4, 1993) (reporting that
the Japan Fair Trade Commission will formally propose "to other government agencies later this
month that all cartels currently exempt from the Antimonopoly Law and other statutes be abol-
ished by the end of 1995").
97. See International Antitrust Working Group, supra note 89.
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3. Vertical Agreements
Except for a resale price maintenance agreement, a vertical
agreement should be treated under the rule of reason since some
vertical agreements may have pro-competitive effects. At this stage
a wide-ranging international unification in this area of competition
law is probably not possible.
4. Mergers & Acquisition
There is a pressing need for harmonization of filing requirements
under a unified format to be used in merger laws of member states.
Both the DIAC Report98 and the ABA Report99 propose a filing
system under the internationally unified format. This should be pro-
moted and member states should agree on a common format. As far
as the substance of merger laws is concerned, it is probably not pos-
sible to come up with internationally unified rules under which each
member state regulates mergers and acquisitions since the regula-
tion of mergers and acquisitions is closely related to the peculiar
industrial structure of the state concerned and its industrial policy.
It is possible, however, to come up with a common format for
merger guidelines. This will greatly enhance transparency in the
control of mergers and acquisitions by a member state. For exam-
ple, member states can jointly create a format which should be used
when each state issues a set of merger guidelines. A format would
include such items as: (i) utilization of HHI for a measurement of
concentration, (ii) the efficiency defense, (iii) the failing company
doctrine, and (iv) a threshold in terms of assets and/or market
share under which there will be no challenge to a merger or
acquisition.
5. Predatory Pricing
There should be an agreement that each state include a require-
ment for a below-cost selling (marginal cost, average variable cost,
or total cost). The enforcement agency of any member state should
decide whether a pricing is predatory on that basis.
The above list is not intended as a comprehensive and exhaustive
list but only as an illustration of some items that should be included
98. Id.
99. See Hawk, supra note 92, at 530.
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in an international competition code. With differences and diver-
gences of competition laws of member states, we need to list only
such items as can be reasonably expected to be accepted by member
states. This is a partial and incomplete convergence program. How-
ever, this is probably all we can hope to achieve in the near future.
C. An "Installment Approach" for Antitrust Convergence
Although the WTO is not the only forum in which a scheme of
convergence of competition laws can be discussed, we assume that a
program of convergence of competition laws will take place within
the WTO framework. Of more than 100 states which signed the
WTO Agreement, some of them do not have competition laws and
many of them are not yet ready for such laws. 00 When one drafts
an international competition code today which fits into the reality of
all those states, it will be so general and abstract that its substance
will be almost empty.
One possibility may be in Annex 4 of the WTO approach. As
touched upon earlier, Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement contains
agreements whose adoption is optional to member states.' 0' An ex-
ample is the optional Government Procurement Agreement. 02 Pro-
fessor Petersmann proposed that an international competition code
may be proposed as an agreement of Annex 4 of the WTO Agree-
ment. 03 It may be that at least in the initial stage an international
competition code among smaller number of member states works
more effectively. Such an agreement may be a trilateral agreement
in which the United States, the EU and Japan join. This is an
agreement among the parties in which "market access" issue is an
intensive political issue. It may be an agreement in which such
states as the United States, the EU, Canada, Japan, Australia and
New Zealand join or it may encompass a larger membership.
As an alternative, Annex 4 may be modified to contain an agree-
ment which contains a comprehensive convergence program, but
provides a grace period to developing states such as that in the
TRIPs Agreement.104 This approach has the advantage that devel-
100. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for the GATT-WTO
World Trade and Legal System, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 35 (1993) [hereinafter Petersmann, Inter-
national Competition].
101. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
102. Petersmann, supra note 101, at 64-83.
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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oping states are afforded a preparation period before such states un-
dertake full enforcement responsibility. Although at the initial stage
developing states are not the parties to an agreement with full re-
sponsibility to carry out obligations under the international code,
they are still members of it and, in due course, they will take a full
pledge of obligations.
The GATS may be a model for convergence in antitrust mat-
ters. 1 5 The GATS provides for a general scheme for future negotia-
tions in the liberalization of trade in services with the general princi-
ples of most-favored nation and transparency. 1 6 At the moment, the
liberalization of trade in services is largely left to future negotiations
and the GATS only provides for a scheme for such negotiations.10 7
This is due to the fact that trade in services is such a complex field
where different kinds of issues are involved and where interests of
member states are opposed. Nevertheless, it is very significant that
this scheme for negotiation exists since there is a prospect that pro-
gress will be made in the future.
The state of affairs with regard to international competition law
may not be so different from that in trade in services. In this per-
spective, therefore, it may make sense to consider whether a negoti-
ating scheme such as the GATS may be adopted with regard to
international competition policy.
Inclusion of an international competition code in the WTO
Agreement has an advantage in that coordination between competi-
tion policy and other policies embodied in WTO agreements such as
the TRIPs, 0 8 the Safeguard Agreement'0 9 and the Antidumping
Agreement" 0 is easier than it would be if a competition code was
established separate from the WTO. Another advantage is that the
dispute settlement process incorporated in Annex 2 of the WTO
Agreement can be utilized when a dispute arises from the enforce-
ment of competition laws. An example of such a dispute would be
insufficient enforcement of competition law by a member state in
light of the principles agreed upon in an international competition
code and an excessive assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a
member state.
105. See supra note 11.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the TRIPS agreement).
109. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the Safeguard Agreement).
110. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the Antidumping Agreement).
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III. ADDITIONAL REMARKS
There are several areas of international competition law and pol-
icy which are not touched upon in this paper but are closely related
to this issue. There are several agreements included in the WTO
Agreement that are closely related to international competition pol-
icy and should be given due regard.
One is the Antidumping Agreement agreed upon in the UR.11'
There are inherent biases against importation in the structure of an-
tidumping law as shown in such areas as price calculation, injury
determination, standing to bring petition and others.112 In addition
to those, the existing antidumping laws of member states have been
much abused. 113 In the Antidumping Agreement agreed upon in the
UR and included in the WTO Agreement, several principles are in-
cluded which would rationalize the enforcement of antidumping
laws of member states."" However, there are some exceptions to the
principles and, in some other areas, there are setbacks also. The
WTO must mitigate the abuses of antidumping legislation by incor-
porating in it some principles of competition law and policy. This
will be a formidable task. However, failure to do so will destroy the
effect of trade liberalization intended by the WTO system.
Another is the TRIPs Agreement. 1 In the TRIPs, insufficient
attention was paid to competition law issues. For example, although
there is a provision in the TRIPs that member states can enact a
111. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the Antidumping Agreement).
112. Graig R. Giesze, Mexico's New Antidumping and Countervailing Duty System: Policy
and Legal Implications, As Well As Practical Business Risks and Realities, For United States
Exporters to Mexico in the Era of the North American Free Trade Agreement. 25 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 885, 889 (1994) (discussing the profound transformation of United States/Mexico trade rela-
tions over the past decade); David Palmeter, Injury Determination in Antidumping and Counter-
vailing Duty Cases - A Commentary on U.S. Practice, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 7, 45 (1987); A.
Paul Victor, Injury Determinations by the United States International Trade Commission in An-
tidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 749 (1984);
Christopher M. Barbuto, Note, Toward Convergence of Antitrust and Trade Law: An Interna-
tional Trade Analogue to Robinson-Patman, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2047, 2089 (1994) (discussing
standard to bring petition).
113. See Roger P. Alford, Why a Private Right of Action Would Violate GATT, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 696, 708 n.89 (1991) (discussing a proposal to establish a private right of action to counter-
act illegal dumping in contrast to current procedure in the United States which requires an ad-
ministrative proceeding to determine the propriety of imposing an antidumping duty); Diane P.
Wood, "Unfair" Trade Inquiry: A Competition Based Approach, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1157
(1989) (discussing the principal set of competition laws, other than the United States statutes,
loosely known as "trade statutes").
114. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 12.
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national law to deal with restrictive conditions attached to licensing
of technology, no principle is internationally agreed upon in order to
regulate such restrictive conditions.116 As such, it is desirable that
the WTO creates some principles.
Also, the TRIPs Agreement carefully avoided establishing an in-
ternational rule on the prohibition of parallel importation of genuine
products under patent and trademark laws.'1 7 There is a divergence
among member states with regard to prohibiting parallel importa-
tion of products under their patent law and trademark law. 18 The
prohibition of parallel importation in some member states may be
contrary to the principle of competition. This divergence may be a
disturbing factor in international trade and the WTO should take
up a review of this issue in light of international competition policy.
Last, but not least, is the Safeguard Agreement." 9 As pointed out
earlier, voluntary export restraint agreements are prohibited in the
Safeguard Agreement. 20 However, a private agreement entered into
among enterprises can easily be used in lieu of a governmentally
authorized agreement. This is a genuine competition law issue and
involves extraterritorial application of competition laws of member
states. A review is needed to see if some additional rules and mecha-
nisms are necessary to strengthen the control of such activities by
member states under the sponsorship of the WTO in light of coordi-
nation between the operations of the Safeguard Agreement and
competition law and policy.
116. Antonio Mendoza, Promoting the Transfer of U.S. Technology Across National Borders:
The Enemy Within, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 97, 99 (1994); John H. Barton & Barry E.
Carter, Symposium: International Law and Institutions for a New Age, 81 GEO. L.J. 535, 550
(1993).
117. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing TRIPs).
118. Cf. William H. Allen, The Supreme Court's Gray-Market Decision, 70 J. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFFICE Soc'y 688, 688-695 (1988); and, Jamie S. Gorelick and Julia E. Guttman, Parallel
Importation After K-Mart v. Cartier ("COPIAT"), 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE Soc'Y 696,
696-704 (1988) as an illustration of the divergence in their interpretations of the K-Mart decision;
see K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. and the Legality of Gray Market Imports, 75 VA. L. REv. 1397,
1411-15 (1989) (discussing a U.S. Supreme Court case which addressed the validity of customs
service regulations which provide exceptions to federal regulation which prohibit importation of all
goods bearing a US trademark without the mark owner's written consent); Laurence G.C. Kaplan,
The European Community's "Television Without Frontiers" Directive: Stimulating Europe to
Regulate Culture, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 255, 308 (1994) (discussing National Treatment Rules
under GATT which was designed to prevent state imposed limitations on imported goods); see
also GATT art. XI (prohibiting quantitative restrictions on the importation of goods).
119. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
At this stage of progress in international economies today, the at-
tachment to sovereignty among member states is still very strong.
Every international negotiation for a construction of international
scheme must take this factor into consideration. On the other hand,
a globalization of economies has already progressed to an extent
that such an attachment to the national jurisdiction is becoming out
dated. There is, therefore, a wide gate between the nation-state sys-
tem today and the state of the world economy. This creates an un-
certainty. However, this uncertainty will remain until there is har-
monization in international antitrust matters.
